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Among other scholars, G.E.L. Owen and Leonardo Tarán established the traditional view of 
Parmenides, the 5
th
 century BC Greek philosopher, as a numerical monist. A numerical monist is 
a philosopher that advocates one true reality without distinction. More recently, there have been 
alternative interpretations. Standing alone, Jonathan Barnes suggests that Parmenides was not a 
monist. On the other hand, Patricia Curd and Alexander P.D. Mourelatos claim that Parmenides 
expressed limited monism. With the emergence of these arguments, I was compelled to present 
my own perspective. I argue in support of the conventional position, however, unlike Owens and 
Tarán, I offer evidence based on a literary comparison between Parmenides and Shankara, the 8
th
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This is an investigation into the scholarly debate over the classification of the philosophy of 
Parmenides, the 5
th
 century BC Greek philosopher. Scholars do not agree on what type of monist 
Parmenides was, if indeed he was a monist. This paper will demonstrate how a comparison 
between Greek and Indian philosophy can weigh in on the argument.  
Traditionally, Parmenides is considered a numerical monist. A numerical monist is a 
philosopher who believes that there is one true reality without distinction.1This was the position 
notably argued by G.E.L. Owen2 and Leonardo Tarán3 in the 1960s. Not all scholars, however, 
agree with this interpretation. For example, Jonathan Barnes4 and Justin Skirry5 deny that there is 
enough evidence to support the theory of numerical monism. Furthermore, Patricia Curd6 and 
Alexander P.D. Mourelatos7 claim that Parmenides expressed limited monism and went so far as 
to suggest that there is plurality in his poetry.  
I argue in support of the traditional view that Parmenides was in fact a numerical monist. In 
addition to the evidence provided by other scholars, I back up this argument with a comparison 
                                                 
1 G.E.L. Owen, “Eleatic Questions” The Classical Quarterly New Series Vol. 10 No. 1 (May 1960): 86. 
2 G.E.L. Owen 84-102.  
3 Leonardo Tarán, Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays by Leonardo Tarán (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) 175. 
4 Jonathan Barnes, The Arguments of the Philosophers: The Presocratic Philosophers: Volume 1 Thales to Zeno (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 155-230; "Parmenides and the Eleatic One" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979): 
1–21. 
5 Justin Skirry, “The Numerical Monist Interpretation of Parmenides” The Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol 39 (2001): 403-
417. 
6 Patricia Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 65-97. 
7 Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and the Argument in the Fragments (New 





between Parmenides and Shankara, the 8
th
 century AD Indian philosopher and established 
numerical monist. 8  
For a long time, many have recognized the similarities between the philosophies of 
Parmenides and Shankara. R.D. Ranade captured this connection when he referred to Shankara 
as the “Indian Parmenides”. 9 An analysis of Shankara‟s philosophy will demonstrate the validity 
of this epithet. To begin with, it is well known that Shankara was a proponent of the Advaita 
Vedānta school of thought. The central idea is non-dualism. Non-dualism is unequivocally a 
monistic concept of one existence. For this reason, Shankara is universally considered a 
numerical monist by scholars.  
As an Advaita Vedānta philosopher, Shankara taught a doctrine that had been established 
centuries earlier. In addition to the works on Advaita by his predecessors, there are over three 
hundred texts accredited to Shankara himself. There is a wealth of information known about 
Advaita Vedānta and Hindu culture through the work of Shankara and other philosophers. 
Although the details of his philosophy can be interpreted differently, there is no motivation for 
scholars to debate about what type of philosopher Shankara was.  
According to J. Fritz Staal, “Shankara gives an interpretation to the whole of Hindu tradition, 
which is not only a religion, but a complete system of life, including e.g., an elaborate social 
order, a moral code, a canon of duties and rights, etc.”10 On the other hand, there is a narrower 
scope of subjects in the only surviving text of Parmenides, On Nature. 11 Naturally, it is 
                                                 
8 Due to the limited scope of this paper, few arguments regarding dates will be made. Please refer to the footnotes for resources 
regarding this matter. Additionally, as is typical when dealing with subject matter of this kind, the ancient sources are widely 
recognized as unreliable. This is in part because much of the information about the primary sources and authors were retrieved 
from the quotes of other, later writers. Due to the complexity of this matter, this research will not focus on such issues.  
9 R.D. Ranade, “Pre-Socratics,” in History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western Vol. II, ed. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953), 37.  
10 J. Fritz Staal “Parmenides and Indian Thought” The Philosophical Quarterly: An Organ of the Indian Institute of Philosophy 
and the Philosophical Congress Vol. 28 (1955): 96. 





impossible to know what additional topics Parmenides may have discussed in his other works.12. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Parmenides was interested in the same metaphysical subjects as 
Shankara, such as existence and knowledge.  
Unlike Shankara, Parmenides broke from his predecessors. The monistic theme present in his 
poem is what set Parmenides apart from other western thinkers at that time. Not all scholars 
agree, however, that Parmenides was radically different from the other Presocratic philosophers. 
In an effort to assimilate the philosophy of Parmenides to other Presocratics, these scholars do 
not label Parmenides a numerical monist but rather a monist of another sort or not a monist at all. 
This reluctance to recognize the uniqueness of Parmenides leads to misinterpretations that 
neglect the core meaning of his work.  
The ontological and epistemological topics will be the focus of this comparison. This 
research begins with a presentation of the philosophies of Parmenides and Shankara, followed by 
an overview of their historical origins. The rest of the paper is dedicated to a comparative 
analysis of their differences (including regional religious influences) and similarities (such as 
positions on being and illusion). Ultimately, I aim to show that Parmenides‟ view on being is so 
similar to that of Shankara that Parmenides must also be considered a numerical monist.  
                                                 
12 G.S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 257: 
e.g. Plutarch mentions in adv. Colotem III4B (DK 28 B 10) καὶ οὐδὲν ἄρρητον ὠς ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ συνθεὶς 
γραφὴν ἰδίαν, οὐκ ἀλλοτρίαν διαφορῶν τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν (and as befits an ancient natural philosopher, who put together 







THE PHILOSOPHY OF PARMENIDES 
 
Parmenides was a Presocratic philosopher from the Greek colony of Elea, Italy. He was born 
ca. 515 BC and became the founder of the Eleatic school of thought. 13 The only extant work by 
Parmenides, On Nature, is made up of one hundred and sixty-two lines that are fragmentary, 
ambiguous and transmitted to us by various authors over time. For these reasons, it is a challenge 
to determine the meaning of this poem. Nevertheless, an attempt is necessary.  
For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the definitions of being, non-being and 
thinking according to Parmenides. Significant passages relevant to these topics will be presented 
along with a variety of interpretations and arguments.  
The work is split into three parts: the proem, the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion. The 
poem follows an unnamed narrator on a journey through the universe to visit an unidentified 
goddess. Ultimately, the goddess presents the argument to the visitor that there is only one truth 
(ἀληθεῖα) in the world. Every other presumed reality is an illusion. The narrator‟s duty is to take 
this explanation back with him to the mortal world. 
It is generally assumed that the narrator is Parmenides himself.14 The identity of the goddess, 
however, is debatable. Many, who make the attempt, identify the goddess as Dike (Justice)15, 
Nyx (Night)16 or Persephone17. Consider these lines:  
Parmenides fr. 1.11-14, Sextus adv. math. VII, 3 
                                                 
13 G.S. Kirk 239-240. 
14 G.S. Kirk 243. 
15 Karl Deichgräber, Parmenides’ Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts: Untersuchungen zum Prooimion seines Lehrgedichts. Mainz 
1958 (Abh. der Akad. d. Wiss. & Lit. Geistes- und Sozialwiss. Kl., Jahrg. 1958, Nr. 11), 6-7, 37. 
16 John Anderson Palmer, Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), 58-59. 





ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων, 
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός. 
αὐταὶ δ’αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις· 
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.18 
 
There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day  
and a lintel and a stone threshold enclose them. 
They themselves, high in the air, are blocked with great doors 
and avenging Justice holds the alternate bolts.19 
 
It is tempting to identify the goddess as Dike since she is briefly mentioned as holding the 
„alternate bolts‟ i.e. the keys to the gates of the passages of Night and Day. Night can be 
understood as darkness, illusion, and ignorance. Day can be interpreted as the light, truth, and 
knowledge. Since she holds the keys, she has the power to reveal truth. Accordingly, Dike fits 
nicely because she can serve as a symbol of judgment between truth and illusion.  
There are, however, issues with this interpretation as well as compelling arguments in 
support of other goddesses.20 Kirk, Raven and Schofield refer to her only as “the goddess” and 
make no argument as to her identity.21 Although it is a topic worth discussing, the identity of the 
goddess is not paramount to understanding the overall purpose of the poem. On account of this, 
in the footsteps of Kirk, Raven and Schofield, I will leave the goddess unnamed.  
Returning to the events described in the poem, it is important to focus on the interactions be 
Parmenides and the goddess. At the end of the proem, Parmenides reaches the goddess. She 
explains to him that the purpose of their meeting is for her to reveal to him the truth of the world. 
The nature of the argument is two fold: there is a right way to think and a wrong way to think. 
The following passage introduces the issue and provides the parameters of the argument at hand: 
                                                 
18 G.S. Kirk 242. 
19 G.S. Kirk 243. 
20 One issue is geographic. Being that she is mentioned as holding the alternate bolts to the doors that begin the paths of Day and 
Night, she seems to be standing at the entrance of these doors. She is stated as having been talked into opening the gates. 
Parmenides and company go through the doors and continue the quest to find the goddess. Therefore, how could she be located at 
the destination as well unless they go full circle? Please see the sources cited above to understand the arguments in support of the 
other goddesses.  





Parmenides fr. 1.28-32, Simplicius de caelo 557, 25ff. 
…Χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι 
ἠμέν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ 
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
Ἀλλ΄ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα 
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.22 
 
It is proper that you should learn all things, 
both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth, 
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliance  
But nonetheless you shall learn these things too,  
how what is believed would have to be assuredly 
pervading all things throughout.23 
 
This introduction foretells the argument to come in such a way that the reader becomes 
prepared for a series of proof. At this stage, it is essential to point out that Parmenides is credited 
with being the „inventor of argument.‟ Charles Kahn states, “the poem of Parmenides is the 
earliest philosophic text which is preserved with sufficient completeness and continuity to permit 
us to follow a sustained line of argument.”24 The purpose, testability and validity of his argument 
have been the focus for many scholars. According to some, he offers a slew of contradictions and 
fallacies. I do not claim to have the answers for these issues but I will present them. Although 
there may be no resolution for some of the problems, I believe that that Parmenides‟ argument is 
coherent enough to prove that he is a numerical monist. 
Unlike most, Jonathon Barnes believes that Parmenides was not concerned with the validity 
of his argument but with the demonstration of argumentation. He claims that On Nature is a 
request for future philosophers to offer an argument against other arguments. In doing so, they 
would move beyond asserting their own beliefs and into refuting the beliefs of others.25 Barnes 
states, “Parmenides‟ views on the objects of inquiry are not merely antique exhibits in the roomy 
                                                 
22 G.S. Kirk 242. 
23 G.S. Kirk 243. 
24 Charles H. Kahn “The Thesis of Parmenides” The Review of Metaphysics Vol. 22, No. 4 (June 1969): 700.  





museum of philosophical follies: the arguments he adduces, though unsound, are ingenious and 
admirable; their conclusion, though false, has a strange plausibility and attractiveness.”26 
Barnes suggests that the complexity of the poem is seemingly inconsequential to its purpose. 
Although Barnes gives up on any valid interpretation of Parmenides, I believe that he does not 
take into consideration the amount of attention Parmenides gave to being and non-being. Given 
the depth of description, these topics should not be disregarded as a means to an end for 
argument‟s sake. The definitions of being and non-being make up the core of Parmenides 
philosophy and are the greatest source of evidence for their classification as numerical.  
As many scholars have recognized, the essential factor in the interpretation of Parmenides‟ 
being is the identification of the subject of ἔστι. Consider this passage from the Way of Truth: 
Parmenides fr. 2.1-3, Proclus in Tim. I, 345, 18 
εἰ δ’ἄγ’ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκοὐσας, 
αἳπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι· 
ἡ μὲν ὃπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι... 
 
Come now, and I will tell you 
(and you must carry my account away with you when you have heard it) 
the only ways of enquiry that are to be thought of. 
The one, that [it] is and that it is impossible for [it] not to be 27 
 
 The interpretation of the unexpressed subject of ἔστι effects the way in which a scholar 
approaches and classifies Parmenides. Scholars that believe Parmenides was a numerical monist 
must say that Parmenides argues for the existence of only one thing. The definition of what this 
one thing is varies; be it what is, existence as a whole or thought.28 It was Hermann Diels that 
claimed the subject is what is.29 On the other hand, Francis Cornford asserted that the subject is 
                                                 
26 Jonathon Barnes Presocratic Philosophers 172. 
27 G.S. Kirk 245. 
28 John Palmer Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), 74. 





The One Being.30 Owen refuted both these arguments and claimed that it is what can be thought 
of.31 I argue that all of their interpretations are congruent with numerical monism. In other words, 
what is is inherently The One Being that is what can be thought of.  
 Before going on to a more in-depth look into the numerical monism of Parmenides, it is 
necessary to present the opposing view, namely that Parmenides is not a numerical monist. 
Those who do not classify Parmenides as a numerical monist argue that the subject of ἔστι in the 
above passage is any number of individual elements that can be tested to exist. The following 
analysis will demonstrate that this is a misleading interpretation motivated by the desire to 
assimilate Parmenides to his predecessors.  
Patricia Curd does not believe that ἔστι has an existential meaning. Instead, the subject of 
ἔστι is meant to be any physical substance. Therefore, she claims that Parmenides is a 
predicational monist. A predicational monist maintains that each object can only be itself, 
therefore there is no single unity in the universe. Curd argues that Parmenides‟ poem offers a 
formula to test the validity of those elements that the material monists identified as the 
foundations of the universe.  Consider the case of Thales and water.  Curd states that water is 
whole (οὖλον), uncreated (ἀγένητον), imperishable (ἀνώλεθρόν), etc.32  Therefore, since water 
passes the test, it can be concluded that it validly exists. 
 This line of argument is based in the assumption that Parmenides maintains the interests 
of his predecessors. As such, he intends to offer explanations for the world through physical 
inquiry.33 Not only is she arguing that Parmenides is like the Presocratics before him but also 
those after him. Curd identifies Atomism, Pluralism and Plato‟s Theory of Forms as responses to 
                                                 
30 G.E.L. Owen 92. 
31 G.E.L. Owen 95. 
32 Patricia Curd 72-71. 





Parmenides. Since these theories argue for the plurality of elements without attacking the 
monism of Parmenides, Curd suggests that Parmenides must himself have been in support of a 
type of limited pluralism.34 In other words, even though Curd identifies Parmenides as a monist, 
the monism is on a small scale limited to an individual element and not a large existential scale.    
Patricia Curd‟s interpretation, however, is contradictory to fr. 1.31-32, ἀλλ’ ἔμπης καὶ 
ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.35  
Whatever exists, exists on all levels. The classification of Parmenides as a predicational monist 
who supports plurality is in direct conflict with the statements the goddess makes. It not only 
warps his definitions of being but also minimizes the individuality of his concepts. For this 
reason, he should not be considered a predicational monist. 
Interestingly, Tarán stated, “at such an early stage of the argument there is no reason to 
suppose that Parmenides assumes his reader to be in a position to supply a definite subject.”36 
Although I agree that the definition of being according to Parmenides is an ongoing explanation 
that is not fully entertained in the beginning, I argue that it is still essential to understand in order 
to identify the subject of ἔστι as one being, defined throughout the poem. The complex nature of 
his philosophy forces one to look at the multitude of subcategories that make up the definition of 
being, : dualism vs. non-dualism, thinking vs. being, and ultimatly the answer lies in the 
understanding of existence vs. non existence.    
Let us first consider his position on dualism:  
Parmenides fr. 8.22-25, Simplicius in Phys. 144, 29 
oὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁµοῖον·  
οὐδέ τι τῇ µᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι µιν συνέχεσθαι,  
οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ΄ ἔµπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.  
                                                 
34 Patricia Curd 3. 
35 G.S. Kirk 242: translation provided above. 





Τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. 37  
 
Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike;  
nor is it more here and less there,  
which would prevent it from holding together,  
but it is all full of being.  
So it is all continuous: for what is draws near to what is. 38 
 
 There does not seem to be room for dispute about whether or not Parmenides‟ philosophy 
allows for distinction. It simply does not. Martin Heidegger‟s interpretation of the following 
passage reveals how complex the Parmenides‟ concept of duality truly is. Since the topics 
addressed in the poem are so integrate, combined in this analysis of duality is an investigation 
into the Parmenides‟ meaning of thinking vs. being: 
Parmenides fr.3, Clement Strom. VI, 23; Plotinus V, I, 8 
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. 
For thinking and Being are the same.39  
 Heidegger‟s investigation into the meaning of this passage is thought provoking though 
he does not offer a definitive answer to its message. He suggests that Parmenides is disclosing 
the distinction between thinking and being made by mortals.40 The distinction is dualistic and 
therefore false. Heidegger identifies the phrase τὸ αὐτὸ as the key to understanding the 
relationship between thinking and being though he does not state what door this key opens.41 He 
explained that there could be endless discussion over the relationship between thinking and being 
according to Parmenides.42 Who could disagree?  
 Some scholars suggest that thinking is being because it is the way in which being is 
                                                 
37 G.S. Kirk 250.  
38 G.S. Kirk 250-251.  
39 Martin Heidegger “Moira: Parmenides VIII, 34-41” in Early Greek Thinking trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi 
(San Francisco: HarperSanFransico 1984), 79. 
40 Martin Heidegger 89. 
41 Martin Heidegger 100. 





represented. Others contend that thinking is part of the everything that is being.43 I agree with the 
latter. Parmenides is not only pointing out this particular distinction but also removing the 
validity of it, further evidence of unity in Parmenides‟ poem. This unitary, non-dualist, 
perspective is most relevant for proving that he was a numerical monist. 
This concept of non-dualism that is so essential to Parmenides‟ definition of the relationship 
between thinking and being is inherently present in his explanation of non-being as well. Think 
about the following passage from the Way of Truth: 
Parmenides fr. 8.7-11, Simplicius in Phys. 78, 5; 145, 5  
…οὐδ’ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω 
φάσθαι σ’οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητὸν 
ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ’ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν 
ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; 
οὕτως ἢ πάµπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.44  
 
I shall not allow you to say nor to think that it came from not being:  
for it is not to be said nor thought that it is not; 
and what need would have driven it later rather than earlier,  
beginning from the nothing, to grow? 
Thus it must either be completely or not at all.45  
 
 Since only what exists is able to be thought about, and thinking is being, then non-
existence can have no part in being. This presents an interesting issue. We are able to think and 
say things such as, “there is no Santa.” 46  Therefore, since we thought about what is not, we have 
brought what is not into being. Being is not only the physical and the tangible, but also the 
conceptual. This is because when we try to think Santa Claus (or think anything), we are drawn 
to thinking of just one thing, Being. In order to stay true to the concept of no distinction, Santa 
                                                 
43 Martin Heidegger 80-82: Heidegger argues that many of these interpretations are too „easily accessible‟ and based too much on 
modern thinking. Given my argument that Parmenides is a numerical monist, my interpretation is naturally that thinking is part of 
being and not separate. Although this may seem to simplify the passage and qualify as an easy interpretation according to 
Heidegger, keep in mind that I support the idea that there is much more to say about the relationship between thinking and being. 
Since that relationship is not the focus of this argument, I will not elaborate. 
44 G.S. Kirk 249. 
45 G.S. Kirk 249-250. 





Claus must be understood as not merely a part of Being, but as Being. In this way, saying that 
Santa does not exist is like saying Being does not exist. If existence can be and not be 
simultaneously, existence and non-existence are different and identical.47  
The only resolution for this quagmire goes back to the relationship between thinking and 
being. Owen goes on to explain this by citing Parmenides‟ pivotal statement from fragment 6, 
“what can be spoken and thought of must exist; for it can exist, whereas nothing cannot”.48 
Parmenides elaborates on this paradox in the following way:  
Parmenides fr. 6.4-9, Simplicius in Phys. 86, 27-28; 117, 4-13 
…ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδοτες οὐδὲν 
πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν 
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται 
κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, 
οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται 
κοὐ ταὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος. 
 
…mortals wander knowing nothing, 
two-headed; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts 
and they are carried along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, 
undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to be and not to be are the same 
and not the same; and the path taken by them all is backward-turning.49 
 
 The description above sums up Parmenides‟ view on the dualistic nature of human 
thought. This is congruent with his presentation of thinking and ultimately being. Contrasting 
what exists to what does not exist inherently creates distinction just as contrasting thinking to 
being. This, of course, violates being and therefore reality. Since the duality created by the 
distinction between being and non-being and thinking and being has the same source as any 
other duality, namely human illusion, they are the same issue: the denial of non-dualism. An 
example of this mortal habit is in the following passage: 
Parmenides fr.8.53-56, Simplicius in Phys. 38, 28 
                                                 
47 G.E.L. Owen 91. 
48 G.E.L Owen 94. 





μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώµας ὀνοµάζειν·  
τῶν µίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν - ἐν ᾧ πεπλανηµένοι εἰσίν -  
τἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέµας καὶ σήµατ’ ἔθεντο  
χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, 
ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ’ ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωὐτόν, 
τῷ δ’ἑτέρῳ μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ’αὐτὸ 
τἀντία νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε.50 
 
For they made up their minds to name two forms,  
of which they needs not name so much as one  
– that is where they have gone astray –  
and distinguished them as opposite in appearance  
and assigned to them signs different one from the other –  
to one the aitherial flame of fire, gentle and very light, 
in every direction identical with itself, but not with the other; 
and that other too is in itself just the opposite, dark night, 
dense in appearance and heavy. 51 
 
Mortals exercise dualism by dividing thinking and being and categorizing things either as 
existing or not existing. In the same way, humans do so just by naming one thing separate from 
another. Recall fragment 1.32 διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα. By having distinctions, the true 
reality of the unity of everything is lost. Everything cannot be/pierce through everything if 
everything is defined separately from one another. 
Now that we have established what being is not, let us consider what being is. As a final 
analysis in this chapter, reflect on the following passages from the Way of Truth: 
Parmenides fr. 8.26-31, Simplicius in Phys. 145, 27 
αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν 
ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος 
τῆλε μάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. 
ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται 
χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μενεῖ· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη 
πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει. 
 
But changeless within the limits of great bonds 
it exists without beginning or ceasing, 
since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, 
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and true conviction has thrust them off. 
Remaining the same and in the same place  
it lies on its own and thus fixed it will remain 
For strong Necessity holds it within the bonds of a limit, 




Parmenides fr. 8.1-5, Simplicius in Phys. 78, 5; 145, I, 5 
μόνος δ᾽ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο  
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήµατ’ ἔασι  
πολλὰ µάλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,  
οὖλον µουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεµὲς ἠδὲ τέλειον·  
οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁµοῦ πᾶν,  
ἕν, συνεχές·   
 
There still remains just one account of a way, that it is.  
On this way there are very many signs, that being uncreated and imperishable it is,  
whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect.  
It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together, one, continuous.53 
 
According to Parmenides, being is not only what exists but also what always exists. 
There is no beginning or end. This explanation confirms that Parmenides is not talking about 
certain items that exist, but rather, existence as a whole. In sum, being is being. The subject of 
what is can be none other than being. For this reason, there is no difference between the 
interpretation of Parmenides’ being by Diels, Cronford and Owen. Because all things are one, no 
exception, no distinction, being is what is, it is what can be thought of and it is one. 
Only the main passages about being and non-being have been presented in this chapter. 
There is a wealth of scholarly texts providing a variety of interpretations that have not been fully 
addressed.54 Nevertheless, from these passages, it can be concluded that Parmenides believed in 
only one reality, one truth, and that is that being is a universal existence that encompasses all 
things without distinction. 
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PARMENIDES AND THE PRESOCRATICS 
 
J.F. Staal states, “the great danger of all comparisons is artificial isolation, i.e., an unjustified 
abstraction from the context to which the considered philosophies belong.”55 For this reason, it is 
paramount to contextualize the philosophy of Parmenides before moving into a discussion on the 
philosophy of Shankara. The following is a review of the evolution of Greek philosophy as it 
pertains to the argumentation present in the poetry of Parmenides.56 It will demonstrate that the 
philosophy of Parmenides, as described in the previous chapter, was in fact very different than 
the philosophy of his fellow thinkers. 
As has been mentioned, Parmenides was a Presocratic philosopher. Generally, the 
Presocratics were concerned with explaining the world through rational and empirical concepts 
that were not solely based in mythology.57 As Kirk, Raven and Schofield point out, there were 
earlier attempts to provide descriptions of nature prior to the emergence of the Presocratics. For 
example, Hesiod postulates the physical make up of the Underworld:  
Hesiod Theogony 726 
τòν πέρι χάλκεον ἕρκος ἐλήλαται· ἀμφì δέ μιν νùξ 
τριστοιχεì κέχυται περì δειρήν· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν 
γῆς ῥίξαι πεφύασι καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης. 
    
Αround it (Tartaros) a brazen fence is drawn;  
and all about it Night in three rows is poured, around the throat;  
and above are the roots of earth and unharvested sea. 58  
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These attempts to explain the world were “not truly „philosophical‟; they are mythic rather 
than rational.”59 The earliest known effort to rationally describe the world began with Thales in 
the late 7
th
 and early 6
th
 centuries BC.60 He is considered the first Greek physicist and Presocratic 
philosopher. Thales is best known for predicting an eclipse and stating that water was the 
universal element of all things. Anaximander soon followed by suggesting an indefinite 
foundation for the world. It is not, however, until the arrival of Xenophanes and Pythagoras in 
the 6
th
 century BC, that the philosophical foundations for Parmenides become more relevant.  
Scholars continue to debate whether Parmenides was a follower of Xenophanes, Pythagoras 
or neither. An analysis of Parmenides‟ poetry reveals that there is no evidence to support an 
argument that Parmenides was a student of Xenophanes or Pythagoras. Instead, it will be 
demonstrated that based on the evidence currently available, Parmenides developed his own 
metaphysical theories that set him apart from his predecessors.  
According to Aristotle, Simplicius, Diogenes Laertius and others, Parmenides was a pupil of 
Xenophanes. Xenophanes was originally from Ionia. He reportedly spent time in Elea where he 
met Parmenides. The evidence for this is inconclusive. Although it is conceivable that 
Xenophanes visited Elea, the resources on the life of Xenophanes, as with all Presocratics, are 
notoriously unreliable.61 Besides possibly having been in Elea at some point, his connection with 
Parmenides remains apocryphal. Those who contend that Parmenides‟ poetry reveals his 
connection to Xenophones do not have much evidence. A comparison between Xenophanes‟ and 
Parmenides‟ works reveals a weak bridge between the two.  
Xenophanes fr. 26 and 25, Simplicius in Phys. 23, 11 and 23, 20 
αἰεί δ’ ἐν ταὐτῷ μίμνει κινούμενος οὐδέν 
οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαί μιν ἐπιπρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ, 
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ἀλλ’ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. 
 
Always he remains in the same place, moving not at all;  
nor is it fitting for him to go to different places at different times,  
but without toil he shakes all things by the thought of his mind.62  
 
Parmenides fr. 8, 3-6, Simplicius in Phys. 78, 5; 145, 1, 5 
ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,  
οὖλον µουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεµὲς ἠδὲ τέλειον·/  
οὐδέ ποτ΄ ἦν οὐδ΄ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁµοῦ πᾶν,  
ἕν, συνεχές·   
 
…that being uncreated and imperishable it is,  
whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect 
It never was nor will be, since it is now, all together, one, continuous. 63 
 
Although there are elements of Xenophanes‟ and Parmenides‟ philosophies that appear 
similar, this is not evidence enough to suggest that Parmenides is following the lead of 
Xenophanes. Xenophanes argues that there is one non-anthropomorphic god that is motionless 
and in control of everything. Parmenides is discussing the essence of Being. It cannot be 
concluded that Parmenides‟ Being is a deity of sorts. The only apparent connection between 
Parmenides and Xenophanes is that they both write in hexameter.64 According to Kirk, Raven 
and Schofield, “the connection between Xenophanes and Parmenides obviously depends on the 
superficial similarity between the motionless one deity of the former and the motionless sphere 
of Being in the latter.”65 There is not enough evidence to support a greater connection. 
On the other hand, some have suggested that Parmenides was a Pythagorean. Diogenes 
Laertius (who claimed that Parmenides was once a student of Xenophanes) asserts that 
Parmenides had rejected the teachings of Xenophanes and became a Pythagorean.66  Strabo also 
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claims that Parmenides was originally a Pythagorean. There is, however, little indication in On 
Nature that Parmenides considered himself a Pythagorean.67  
There are no records of anything written by Pythagoras of Samos. 68 According to later 
sources, he believed in reincarnation and refrained from eating meat except during religious 
ceremonies.69 Kirk, Raven and Schofield point out that Parmenides‟ use of the phrase ζηυγεποῖο 
ηόκου70 could possibly be a reference to Pythagoreanism. 71 Nevertheless, there is just not enough 
to prove that he was a Pythagorean.  
Parmenides stands out as a unique Presocratic philosopher. His poem brings up previously 
unaddressed topics and for that reason, he cannot be strongly linked to his predecessors . The 
amount of debate over his place among the Presocratics is a testament to his individuality. 
Understanding this is essential to classifying his philosophy because it allows him to be 
categorized in a manner unlike his fellow Presocratic western thinkers. Also, now that his 
philosophy has been examined and contextualized, it is possible to do a comparison with 
Shankara and the tradition of Indian philosophy.  
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHANKARA 
 
Staal describes Indian philosophers as links in a chain of philosophical development. 
Individuality is neither significant nor sought after.72  An Indian philosopher is tightly bound to 
whatever religious scripture with which they identify.  This is undoubtedly true for Shankara 
(also known as Ādi Śaṅkara, Ādi Śaṅkarācārya, Śaṅkara Bhagavatpādācārya, Samkara, etc.).  
Shankara was born into the Nambudri Brahmin caste in Kāladi, Kerala, India. The exact 
dates of his lifespan are unknown (possibly 788-820 AD or 700-732 AD). He wrote 
commentaries (bhāṣyas), treatises and manuals (prakaraṇa granthas) as well as various styles of 
poetry (stotras). Shankara is the credited author of over three hundred works.73  
Most of Shankara‟s texts were written in prose as opposed to poetry. Thus, scholars do not 
have to battle with as much ambiguity as is present in Parmenides‟ work. This is not to say there 
are not contradictions and other issues. Overall, however, there is no debate that Shankara was a 
Hindu and a numerical monist who promoted the Advaita (non-dualism) Vedānta (on the 
authority of the Vedas) school of thought. Shankara‟s argument relies on scriptural quotes that 
are supplemented by his interpretation of their meaning. 
Advaita Vedānta has been widely documented and studied. One of the fundamental sources 
for this philosophy is Shankara‟s Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya (Commentary on the Brahmasūtra) also 
known as the Vedānta Sūtras.74 In this text, Shankara offers his views on a variety of 
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philosophical topics ranging from consciousness to space. In doing so, he reveals the make-up of 
the Advaita Vedānta philosophy.  
Although Shankara discusses many other concepts, his take on ontology and epistemology 
will be focused on for the purposes of this paper. To begin with, the ultimate goal for a follower 
of Advaita Vedānta is to reach total understanding of Brahman. Brahman is a complex concept at 
the core of the Vedānta Sutras (hence the metonym Brahmasūtra). The knowledge of Brahman is 
to be gained through intense scriptural study and contemplation.75 This complete understanding 
of Brahman is called Ultimate Reality, Pure Consciousness or Consciousness of the Pure Self.76 
The reality is as follows: Brahman exists; Brahman is the origin of everything; everything that 





Light is Brahman 
because of the mention of feet77 
 
The ambiguity of the above passage demonstrates the difficulty associated with interpreting 
the scripture. Because of its enigmatic nature, many ancient and modern scholars‟ interpretations 
differ greatly based on their own philosophical background. Shankara acknowledges the puzzling 
nature of the passages, presents the interpretations by thinkers with opposing views, and argues 
in support of his own interpretations. 
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By examining Shankara‟s interpretation of Brahman, we can understand his thoughts on 
being and knowledge. Brahman is from the Sanskrit root br̥h 78 and means „greatest.‟79 Some 
philosophers over the centuries have taken the term Brahman to represent the individual soul or a 
god. Although there is a level of personification in his description of Brahman, Shankara does 




(The omniscience of Brahman follows) 




(Brahman is not known from any other source) 
since the scriptures are the valid means of Its knowledge 
 
Not only can this passage mean that Brahman is the origin of all scripture but it can also be 
translated to mean that the sacred texts are the only source of knowledge about Brahman. 
Shankara offers both of these interpretations since they cause no contradiction. It stands as an 
excellent introduction into the study of Advaita Vedānta because one who wants to reach the goal 
of understanding Brahman must embark on a journey into the meaning and nature of Brahman 
with the guidance of the scriptures. Shankara describes this Brahman as “all-knowing and 
endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.” 82 
The first step along the journey is acknowledging that Brahman exists. According to 
Shankara, the proof of Brahman is the acknowledgement of oneself. While this is essential to 
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Shankara‟s philosophy, Parmenides does not discuss the recognition of oneself. In fact, for 
Parmenides the individual self impedes mortals from understanding the unitary nature of things. 
Although they differ in this respect, it is still important to elaborate on the role of self in 
Shankara‟s philosophy in order to provide a dynamic view of his beliefs. 
For example, Shankara argues that since everyone acknowledges their own existence and 
“never thinks „I am not‟” 83, it can be concluded that everyone acknowledges the existence of 
Brahman. He goes on to explain that the reason why others may disagree with this view is that 
they do not have an accurate understanding of what is Self. Some maintain that Self is the 
physical body or „momentary idea‟ or even nothing.84 
The concept of Self can be a challenge to grasp. I found it most easily comprehensible in 
grammatical terms. For example, in the sentence „I read the book‟, „I‟ is the subject and therefore 
the Self. „The book‟ is the object and therefore the Not-Self. When the copula verb „be‟ is used, 
however, the concept of Self becomes more complex. For example, in the sentence „I am a 
student‟, „I‟ and „a student‟ are made equal by the verb.85 The issue is that „I‟ is Self but „a 
student‟ is Not-Self.  This „superimposition‟, as Shankara calls it, is a violation of reality.86  
Superimposition occurs when the Self and Not-Self are equally joined. Shankara states that 
“if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair as standing, walking, or jumping” this is 
“endless superimposition which appears in the form of wrong conception.”87 Ultimately, the only 
thing that Self can be is Brahman.  
Since non-dualism is the core of Shankara‟s philosophy, it is important to analyze the 
occurrences of dualism that violate his view. Shankara argues that the Maya (illusion) and 
                                                 
83 George Thibaut 14. 
84 George Thibaut 14. 
85 George Cronk 26. 
86 George Thibaut 4. 





Avidya (ignorance) of humans are responsible for the misunderstanding that Self is separate 
from Brahman. An example of Maya and Avidya given is the mistaken identification of a shell 
as silver. The silver is superimposed upon the shell. In this same way, it can be understood that 
the world (c.f. silver) is Brahman (c.f. shell).88  
Another example of misguided dualism, according to Shankara, occurs when people falsely 
believe there is Jiva (individual Self) and Ātman (universal Self) separate from Brahman. 
Shankara describes Ātman as “the very essence of perception itself – thus is its nature 
established which is different from the body; and Atman is eternal, since perception goes on 
eternally and the essence here is one and the same.” Ātman is the same as Jiva. Jiva is merely the 
living form of perception that Ātman becomes when it enters any animate being.  This false 
separation of the two is again the creation of Maya and Avidya. 
After one is able to let go of the divisions created by Maya and Avidya, fully accepting that 
Jiva is one with Ātman, which is Brahman, they have reached the goal.89 This achievement is 
best captured by the simple statement, “I am Brahman.”90 The Self is Brahman, ergo there is no 
Self, only Brahman. This concept of Brahman is also illustrated in the Chandogya Upanishad: 
“Now that which is the subtle essence, the root of all things, the Ground of Being – in it all that 
exists has its True Self. It is Pure Being. It is the True Self, and That thou art.”91 Shankara 
identifies this passage as an important part of the definition of Brahman, the unity of all, the lack 
of dualism and thus the Ultimate Reality.  
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The idea that Self and Brahman are one is non-dualistic (hence the term advaita). Ramaiah 
summed up Shankara‟s belief by stating, “Brahman in itself is impersonal, a homogeneous mass 
of objectless thought, transcending all attributes.”92 Shankara‟s Brahman is synonymous with one 
unitary existence, the definition of numerical monism. 
                                                 







SHANKARA AND THE VEDAS 
 
The accounts of Shankara‟s life (vijayas) were written long after his death (Mādhavīya 
Śaṅkara Vijayaṃ ca. 14th century, the Cidvilāsīya Śaṅkara Vijayaṃ ca. 15th century and the 
Keraļīya Śaṅkara Vijayaṃ ca. 17th century). Although these biographies include a great deal of 
folklore, they provide valuable insight to his connection with his predecessors.93 This includes 
the fact that at some time in his youth, Shankara became the disciple of Govinda Bhagavatpāda 
(commonly referred to as Govinda).  According to legend, Govinda taught Shankara the Advaita 
Vedānta philosophy that had been around for centuries in one form or another.94  
The Advaita Vedānta was developed on the basis of the Vedas. These are the earliest Sanskrit 
texts as well as the oldest Hindu texts. Although the chronology of these texts is debatable, there 
is no doubt that the Vedic tradition had been in place long before the time of Shankara.  
The Vedas were not originally philosophically oriented texts. Systematic philosophy 
permeated the Vedas after centuries of differing interpretation by thinkers of various 
backgrounds and religious affiliations. This is not to say that seeds of philosophy were not 
already planted at the earliest stages of the Vedas. There were topics of creation, what happens 
after death, what happens during sleep, etc.95 All of these themes eventually blossomed into the 
fruit of varying schools of thought. The way in which the philosophy of Shankara arose from the 
Vedas deserves some special attention.   
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The concept of Brahman stems from the Upanisads (about 200 texts that lay out the 
primary doctrines of the Vedas). In this early stage of the development of Indian philosophy, the 
pattern of the formation of the doctrine is as follows: stating of a particular theory of knowledge, 
explanation of the elements in the world that make up the World-picture, then World-edifice, 
World-duration, and then the inferences on conduct and ethics that come from the view.96  
Samkhya is the first system of this type. This is the first time in Indian doctrine that a 
count of elements of existence was made (tattvani). As Frauwallner points out, Samkhya “served 
as the prototype for all other systems.”97 Shortly after, the system of Vaisesika was developed 
which combined the elements of existence with the theory of categories. Frauwallner contends 
that these two systems influenced older doctrines such as Buddhism to develop into a new 
system. Buddhism began with one doctrine (deliverance), and then encompassed many topics of 
philosophy, and became systemized.98  It is widely known that Buddhism had an impact on the 
philosophy of Shankara, who was a devout Hindu that interestingly argued against Buddhism.  
Over time, there was a shift in focus from the formation of the world into the reality of 
the external world.99 It is at this stage of the development of Indian philosophy that “thinkers had 
begun to occupy themselves thoroughly with the inquiry into the epistemological foundations of 
different theories and along with it, with the inquiry into the possibility of right knowledge in 
general. Such as the case in the system of Madhyamaka, where reality and not development of 
the world is the primary topic, “only an appearance of truth can be ascribed to it in contrast to the 
highest truth which alone is real but which lies outside all forms of thought of human knowledge 
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and which, therefore, remains incomprehensible to our thought.”100 This contrasts with the school 
of the Mahayana which believes that the external world is a creation of human consciousness.  
These older systems began to fade as India progressed through the Common Era. After 
500 AD, Samkhya was no longer a prominent doctrine. Vaisesika had the same fate by the 6
th
 
century AD. So follows Madhyamaka.101 It is at this point that the prominence of the religious 
sects comes to the forefront. At this time, there were two major Hindu sects: Vaisnavite (largely 
founded on the Upanisads) and Saivite (based on the belief that Shiva is the supreme god). 
Philosophers either developed regular systems out of the old systems or create new systems by 
bringing their own thoughts into the old. “Only by way of interpreting and explaining the old 
texts, it was possible to bring in new thoughts.” Shankara, a Vaisnavite, was among the former.  
Following in line with the gradual systemization of concepts, the teachings of the 
Upanisads were systemized into one text titled the Brahma Sutra (also called Vedanta Sutras). In 
the early 8
th
 century AD, Shankara wrote a commentary on the Brahma Sutra (called 
Brahmasutra-Bhashya). This is his most famous work, by which he provides his interpretation of 
the Brahma Sutra and thus inherently comments on the Upanisads and ultimately the Vedas. 
Shankara did write commentaries on the Upanisads directly (including the primary Chandogya 
and Mandukya Upanisads) as well as many other texts. Nevertheless, these commentaries never 
reached the fame of his Brahmasutra-Bhashya. So it is that the Brahmasutra-Bhashya both 
connects Shankara to the Vedic texts and also gives the greatest insight into his thought and as a 
result will be the focus of this analysis of Shankara‟s philosophy.  
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The philosophies that followed the development of and had their foundation in the 
Brahma Sūtra (Vedānta Sutras) became known as part of the Vedānta system. This system is also 
called Uttara-Mimamsa meaning „later investigation‟.102 The meaning of this term is two-fold. 
The Vedanta focuses on the last two parts of the Vedas: Aranyakas and Upanisads. In addition, 
there was a Purva-Mimamsa school of thought that preceded the Vedanta. Shankara was the first 
philosopher of this system. He took the thoughts of the old philosophical systems present in the 
Brahma Sutra and through his interpretation of the Vedas he established the Maya (illusion) 
doctrine. He created the view that Brahman (world-soul) is the only reality and as such all else is 
illusion. In this way, a new view of the world emerged and the Vedānta system appeared.  
There are two other major areas in the Vedānta system: Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-
dualism) and Dvaita (dualism). All three believe that there is one Brahman, but they disagree 
over the nature of this Brahman.103 Advaita is the only sect that believes Brahman is not a 
personal creator-savior God. And so it is, the Advaita Vedānta system arose from a longstanding 
tradition first introduced in early Hindu texts and many centuries later amalgamated by 
Shankara. As such, Shankara unequivocally stands for unity of all things and therefore against 
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RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
Before moving into a literary comparison of Parmenides and Shankara, it is important to 
acknowledge the influences of their respective religions. Although they are both polytheists with 
monistic philosophies, their particular brand of polytheism differs. It is understood that 
Parmenides believed in the Greek gods and Shankara in the Hindu gods.  
As has already been established, philosophy and religion have a close relationship in India.104 
This is obvious in the case of Shankara who bases his philosophy on the authority of the 
Vedas.105 The ambiguous nature of the passages in the Vedas, however, allows for flexible 
reasoning. This is why one philosopher can see Brahman as dualistic and another as non-
dualistic. A Hindu philosopher does not seem to be precluded from either interpretation. 
Interestingly, there is not great focus or symbolism of any individual gods throughout 
Shankara‟s commentary. Although he wrote devotional poems to the Shiva, Vishnu and other 
gods, this aspect of Shankara does not ring clear in his commentaries.106 Like different colors of 
paint on a canvas, there is both a blend and a separation between his religious and mystic nature 
in the commentaries. They are religious because they are reflections on the Vedas but they are 
mystical because of the focus on the knowledge of reality.  
A mystic is “one who believes in the spiritual apprehension of truths.”107 Even though the 
philosopher as an individual in Indian philosophy is not significant and individuality in Advaita 
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does not exist, the individual experience of the follower of Advaita is important. This is because 
each person studying Advaita is striving for the apprehension of truth and therefore 
enlightenment.  
Brahmasūtra I.i.1  
अथािो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा 
 
Hence (is to be undertaken) thereafter a deliberation on Brahman108  
 
Shankara‟s explanation of this scriptural quote is, “the knowledge of Brahman has 
emancipation as its result.”109  Therefore, because there is a marriage between scripture and the 
revelation of truth, his work can be understood as a religious and mystical experience. 
Both Shankara and Parmenides are mystics as is evidenced by the nature and themes of their 
philosophies. Unlike in Shankara‟s commentaries, Parmenides‟ poem has more obvious religious 
symbolism. From the beginning, he speaks of gods and goddesses (e.g. Helios‟ daughters, the 
goddess, etc.). The references to such characters have not only great implications of his religious 
nature but also serve as though-provoking symbols of his philosophy. 
Like Shankara, On Nature can be interpreted as the poetic rendition of Parmenides‟ 
emancipation. Some scholars claim that the poetry of Parmenides is a record of Parmenides 
conversion from Pythagoreanism to Eleatic monism. Since it has already been discussed that 
literary evidence does not support the assertion that Parmenides was a Pythagorean, this 
argument will not be entertained here. Nevertheless, there is merit that the poem can be 
understood as a journey from human ignorance to divine revelation. Moreover, this divine 
revelation is littered with religious symbolism. 
Parmenides fr. 1, Sextus adv. math VII, 3 
Ἵπποι ταί µε φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπἱ θυµὸς ἱκάνοι,  
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πέµπον, ἐπεί µ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφηµον ἄγουσαι  
δαίµονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·  
τῇ φερόµην·110 
    
The mares that carry me as far as my heart ever aspires sped me on, 
when they had brought and set me on the far-famed road of the god,  
which bears the man who knows over all cities.  
On that road I was borne;111 
 
In the beginning, the subject of the poem (perhaps Parmenides himself) being driven by a 
chariot led by the daughters of Helios. This chariot goes along a road and through a gate. Staal 
points out that these are universal religious symbols.112 At the end of this ride, a goddess greets 
the subject. The obvious religious significance of a deity need not be explained here. This 
journey has often been identified as a metaphor for the path to a revelation. Additionally, a 
number of scholars have noted that the poem has elements of an initiation.113 
Parmenides fr. 6, Simplicius in Phys. 86, 27-8; 117, 4-13 
δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν  
πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀµηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν  
στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον·  οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται  
κωφοὶ ὁµῶς τυφλοί… 
 
Mortals wander knowing nothing, two headed;  
for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts,  
they are carried along, deaf and blind at once…114 
 
A person who has been initiated into the mysteries is the εἰδότα φῶτα (fr. 1.3). If 
Parmenides is understood to be the subject of the poem, he is the one who has been initiated to 
the mysteries of knowledge. Those who have not been initiated are the βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν (fr. 
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6.4). Peter Kingsley compares Parmenides‟ experience to the descent of Heracles into the 
underworld. Ancient readers of On Nature would have been familiar with this imagery.115  
So it is that both Parmenides and Shankara were not only greatly influenced by religion but 
were also mystics. The influence of religion on their philosophies is witnessed in their direct (the 
goddess) and indirect references (Vedas). Their mysticism is evident by their focus on the 
achievement of true knowledge. 
 
                                                 






SHANKARA AND PARMENIDES 
 
Now that the philosophies of Parmenides and Shankara have been examined and 
contextualized, they can be adequately compared. In order to be considered a numerical monist, 
a philosopher must believe that all things exist as one. The explanations of being by Parmenides 
and Shankara are the strongest source of evidence that they are both numerical monists. Both 
acknowledge a unified existence without distinction. 
When I first analyzed the philosophy of Parmenides, I offered the following line as an insight 
into his thoughts on being: 
Parmenides fr.3, Clement Strom. VI, 23; Plotinus V, I, 8 
τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι. 116 
For Thinking and Being are the same.117  
This can be compared with the famous quote by Rene ́  Descartes “I think therefore I am.”118 
More importantly, it is similar to “I am Brahman.”119 What is said and thought is no different than 
what is. This is the first among many commonalities between Parmenides and Shankara. 
Therefore, in addition to the separate analyses of their philosophies, let me offer a joint synopsis 
of their similarities. The following passage is a refresher of what Parmenides‟ being is: 
Parmenides fr.8.22-25, Simplicius in Phys. 144, 29 
Οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁµοῖον·  
οὐδέ τι τῇ µᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι µιν συνέχεσθαι,  
οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ΄ ἔµπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.  
Τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.  
 
Nor is it divided, since it all exists alike;  
                                                 
116 G.S. Kirk 246. 
117 Martin Heidegger 79. 
118 George Cronk 29. 





nor is it more here and less there,  
which would prevent it from holding together,  
but it is all full of being.  
So it is all continuous:  
for what is draws near to what is. 120 
 






There is non-difference of those cause and effect  
on account of the texts about origin, etc. 121 
 
Shankara identifies the cause as Brahman and the effect as the universe. In order to explain 
this passage, Shankara uses the example of pottery.  Terracotta jars are made from clay.  
Therefore, there is an element that exists in clay that is essential to the make up of a terracotta 
jar.  Because the potential for a pot already resides in the existence of clay, there cannot be non-
existence of the pot even at the earliest stages before formation and firing.  The effect is no 
different than the outcome, “therefore the potency must be the very essence of the cause and the 
effect must be involved in the very core of the potency.”122 Ergo, the universe is Brahman. There 
is no division. Shankara calls Brahman „that great Being‟ which is in everything.123  
Interestingly, Parmenides does not seem to be concerned with cause and effect. He does not 
support his argument with this type of relationship. If it had been presented, however, it could 
have been implemented in the same way and efficiently reinforced his argument.  
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Nevertheless, a significant aspect of being which Parmenides did address is that being has no 
beginning. At first glance, Shankara‟s definition of Brahman differs in this respect. It is 
important to consider his interpretation of the following passage: 
Brahmasūtra I.i.2 
िन्माद्यस्त्य यिः 
That (is Brahman) from which are derived the birth etc. of this (universe)124   
If there is origin, then how can Shankara‟s being be congruent with the continuous being of 
Parmenides? Shankara, however, states that “the Brahman to be inquired into here is a pre-
existing entity; and It is not dependent on human effort, since it is eternally present.”125 Although 
everything originates from Brahman, there is no origin for Brahman. Since Brahman is in and is 
everything, there is no true origin at all.  
For both Shankara and Parmenides, all misperceptions are founded on human illusion 
(maya/δόξα).  Shankara states, “mother of pearl appears like silver, the moon although one only 
appears as if she is double.”126 Furthermore, he says, “any product is no more than a verbal 
handle, a name given to it, but that only the cause is real.” The cause of course being Brahman. 
Parmenides blames mortal illusion as well:  
Parmenides fr.8.53-56, Simplicius in Phys. 38, 28 
Μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώµας ὀνοµάζειν·  
τῶν µίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν - ἐν ᾧ πεπλανηµένοι εἰσίν -  
τἀντία δ΄ ἐκρίναντο δέµας καὶ σήµατ΄ ἔθεντο  
χωρὶς ἀπ΄ ἀλλήλων  
 
For they made up their minds to name two forms,  
of which they needs not name so much as one  
– that is where they have gone astray –  
and distinguished them as opposite in appearance  
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and assigned to them signs different one from the other127 
 
Therefore, It has been demonstrated that both Parmenides and Shankara believe that being 
(or Brahman) is eternal, in everything, without distinction. They also both argue that any 
opposing view on this matter is the result of illusion. While their time periods, locales and 
religions differ, their philosophies have much in common. It is widely accepted that Shankara is 
a numerical monist. On account of their core similarities, I see no reason why Parmenides should 
not also be classified as numerical monist.  
    
                                                 









J.F. Staal argues that the goals are different for Shankara and Parmenides by differentiating 
between Shankara‟s „knowledge of everything‟ and Parmenides‟ „right answer for everything‟.128 
This interpretation ignores the fact that they both claim the knowledge of one true reality. The 
true reality is that “object and subject are unseparated” which Staal himself recognized.129 This 
non-dualism, which is present in Shankara‟s Brahmasutra-Bhashya and Parmenides‟ On Nature, 
is the basis of my argument in support of Parmenides as a numerical monist.  
Parmenides‟ particular subject matter and style were unique enough to become the 
foundations of a new realm of philosophy, the Eleatic School. G.E.L. Owen acknowledged his 
individuality when he stated, “to me it seems sufficient to establish him as the most radical and 
conscious pioneer known to us among the Presocratics.”130 Arguments against the classification 
of Parmenides as a numerical monist are rooted in the desire to assimilate him to his 
predecessors and take away from his individuality.  
Parmenides‟ views on being and non-being fulfill the requirements of a numerical monist, 
which are evidenced by their similarity to the philosophy of Shankara, a well known numerical 
monist. For both Parmenides and Shankara, everything is one and as such there are no 
distinctions. Their passages on being and illusion illustrate this belief. The evidence from this 
literary comparison and the research conducted by past scholars such as Owen and Tarán, 
establishes that Parmenides ought to continue being classified as a numerical monist.
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